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AMENDED COMPLAINTS POST-TWIQBAL: WHY 
LITIGANTS SHOULD STILL GET A SECOND BITE AT 
THE PLEADING APPLE 
Dane Westermeyer 
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal have had a serious effect on the way that Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss 
are handled in federal courts across the country. In the five years since Iqbal was handed 
down, scholars and practitioners alike have discussed the merits and effects of this decision 
at length. However, there has been very little—if any—discussion on the relationship 
between amended complaints and original complaints when it comes to this newly-minted 
plausibility standard. This Comment aims to examine and critique a post-Twiqbal practice 
regarding amended complaints that is beginning to emerge in the Ninth Circuit. A number of 
district courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that courts may compare amended complaints to 
their predecessors as a part of the Twiqbal plausibility analysis. This Comment argues that 
this practice is not in line with the intent of Twiqbal nor with available precedent on amended 
complaints. As such, courts should refrain from adopting this practice going forward, and the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should strike down this emerging practice if presented 
with a chance to do so. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 are amongst 
the most cited Supreme Court decisions of all time.3 These two decisions 
memorialized a new era of pleading in federal courts: “plausibility” 
pleading.4 Scholars have widely commented on the fairness or 
unfairness of the Twombly and Iqbal (“Twiqbal”) pleading standard.5 
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
3. According to Westlaw’s KeyCite service, as of October 2014, Twombly had been cited by over 
106,000 cases, while Iqbal had been cited in over 83,000 cases.  
4. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice 
pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading.”). 
5. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 885 (2010) (“Iqbal is a major decision with an ill-
advised holding and a poorly reasoned opinion.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal 
Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1632 (2012) (“[A]ll the Supreme Court did in 
Twombly and Iqbal was catch up to what lower courts had been doing for some time.”); Arthur R. 
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5, 127 (2010) (noting Twiqbal has “swung the pendulum” too far away from the 
1467 
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However, legal scholars have written very little about the effect that this 
new pleading standard will have on the significance of amended 
pleadings. 
Pre-Twiqbal, the rules regarding amended complaints were fairly 
clear in circuits across the country.6 Amended pleadings are governed by 
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 That Rule instructs 
courts to “freely give leave [to amend pleadings] when justice so 
requires.”8 The Pre-Twiqbal case law on Rule 15 and amended pleadings 
dictated that an amended pleading took its predecessor off the table.9 In 
other words, once a party filed an amended complaint, the previous 
complaint was no longer of any use to the court.10 
Post-Twiqbal, the rules in the Ninth Circuit are not so clear. A few 
district courts in the Ninth Circuit have begun to compare amended 
complaints to their predecessors on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.11 
To better understand this practice, consider a situation in which an 
amended complaint contains allegations that significantly deviate from 
the allegations set forth in the original complaint. Under this recent 
precedent taking hold in the Ninth Circuit, if there are troublesome 
contradictions between these two pleadings, courts may use that 
contradiction against the plaintiff in its plausibility analysis.12 Some 
courts that adopt this approach argue that Twiqbal’s new pleading 
standard justifies this practice.13 
Although this approach may have benefits, it ultimately undermines 
the original purpose behind amended pleadings. Rule 15 is in place in 
order to allow “maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its 
pleading values articulated in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Victor E. Schwartz & 
Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and 
Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1139 (2010) 
(“Twombly and Iqbal recognize that judges must be empowered to manage litigation at the pretrial 
level just as they are throughout other phases of litigation.”); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to 
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1871 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s 
new standards for dismissal under Twombly violate the Seventh Amendment). 
6. See generally 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed. 1998). 
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
8. Id. at 15(a)(2). For more in-depth information on amended complaints, see infra Part.0. 
9. See infra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
10. One exception to this rule comes from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which governs 
when a complaint “relates back” for purposes of statutes of limitations. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). An in-
depth analysis of Rule 15(c) is not appropriate for this Comment, however. 
11. See infra Part 0. 
12. See infra Part III.B.1. 
13. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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merits rather than on procedural technicalities.”14 This suggests that 
plaintiffs need amendments in order to have a “second bite” at the 
pleading apple—so to speak. Yet, under this recent, emerging Ninth 
Circuit practice, it appears that plaintiffs may pay a price for this second 
bite. Twiqbal certainly stands for the proposition that plaintiffs must 
come to court with a well-pleaded case,15 but nothing in Twombly or 
Iqbal expressly requires a court to infringe on the relationship between 
original complaints and subsequent pleadings.16 
This Comment argues that courts should decline to adopt this 
comparative approach to amended complaints for two reasons. First, 
from a stare decisis viewpoint, this practice is in tension with a large 
body of case law defining the purpose of amended complaints. Second, 
it levies undue pressure on plaintiffs to plead their complaints with 
particularity and foresight. As such, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit should clarify this area of the law and hold that plausibility 
analysis does not alter the long-standing relationship between original 
and amended complaints. 
Part I of this Comment offers an overview of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the early evidence regarding the effects 
this new pleading standard has had on federal litigation. Part II explores 
the historical and jurisprudential background surrounding amended 
complaints. Part III outlines how Post-Twiqbal district courts are 
responding to amended complaints. Finally, Part IV lays out an 
argument for why this new approach should not be widely adopted. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. 
TWOMBLY AND ASHCROFT V. IQBAL 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Aschroft v. Iqbal marked the 
official end of the more liberal standard of “notice pleading” 
championed by Conley v. Gibson,17 and ushered in the era of 
“plausibility pleading.”18 Empirical studies are still emerging on what 
14. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471.  
15. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (requiring litigants file complaints with 
“well-pleaded factual allegations” that lead to a plausible claim for relief); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (noting that plaintiffs have to be able to plead “enough fact to 
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the claim asserted).  
16. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. Both Iqbal and Twombly are 
silent on the relationship between amended complaints and original complaints.  
17. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
18. See Spencer, supra note 4. 
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effect—if any—this heightened standard actually has on litigants.19 
Regardless, the sheer amount of citations and scholarly attention that 
these decisions have drawn suggests that these decisions may be 
amongst the most important that the Court has authored for civil 
litigants.20 This Comment is not intended to be an in-depth discussion of 
the merits—or lack thereof—of the Twiqbal movement.21 However, a 
basic understanding of the effect that Twiqbal has had on federal 
litigation provides context for the controversy over amended complaints 
arising in the Ninth Circuit. 
A Brief History of Pleading Standards 
American pleading standards have gone through a number of 
iterations before arriving at Twiqbal’s plausibility pleading standard. 
American pleading began with a system (inherited from England) known 
as common law pleading.22 By the middle of the nineteenth century, 
problems with the rigid structure of common law pleading led to a new 
system: code pleading.23 In the 1930s, the new Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure abandoned code pleading in favor of what eventually became 
known as notice pleading.24 Finally, with the decision rendered in Iqbal, 
notice pleading was pushed out in favor of plausibility pleading.25 Each 
standard is briefly discussed below. 
1. Common Law Pleading and Code Pleading 
The earliest form of pleading practiced in American courts was 
known as common law pleading, which was developed in the English 
19. See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RULES (2011); 
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the 
Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Patricia 
Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012). 
20. See supra note 3 (discussing amount of citations that Twombly and Iqbal have garnered since 
publication); supra note 5 (discussing scholarly attention that Twiqbal has received). 
21. For persuasive and oft-cited examples of authors that have looked at this subject, see Miller, 
supra note 5, and Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010). 
22. James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative 
Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 
1273 (2010). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 1277. 
25. See Spencer, supra note 4. 
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courts of common law.26 Generally, common law pleading required that 
parties allege a single “form of action” that would govern the lawsuit.27 
This form of action determined the court’s choice of law and the 
procedural steps that court was permitted to take.28 In response, a 
defendant was allowed to: (1) contest the legal sufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s factual allegations; (2) contest the truth of a factual assertion 
made by the plaintiff; or (3) accept the factual and legal allegations, but 
assert a new ground under which the defendant is not responsible.29 
Regardless of which route the defendant chose to take, the court could 
only decide one issue.30 This made early decisions quite simple and 
straightforward, but also extremely limited.31 
By the 1850s, American courts had begun to abandon common law 
pleading in favor of a new standard of code pleading famously 
championed by the State of New York and David Dudley Field.32 Code 
pleading abolished the old “form of action” requirements.33 Instead, 
code pleading required that the complaint contain “[a] statement of the 
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, 
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of 
common understanding to know what is intended.”34 A defendant was 
required to respond “to each allegation of the complaint controverted by 
the defendant” with “a specific denial thereof, or of any knowledge 
thereof sufficient to form a belief.”35 Additionally, a defendant was 
allowed to allege any new, related defense to the plaintiff’s complaint.36 
Code pleading gave both plaintiffs and defendants freedom to add 
additional claims and defenses, but eventually that standard also became 
too unwieldy to yield efficient or fair results.37 
26. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 519 
(1925). 
27. See Maxeiner, supra note 22, at 1271. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1271–72. 
30. Id. at 1272 (“No matter which course the parties chose, in classic common law pleading they 
could present only one issue to the court for decision.”). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 1273–74. 
33. Id. at 1273. 
34. An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this 
State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521 (1848). 
35. Id. § 128(1). 
36. Id. § 128(2). 
37. See Maxeiner, supra note 22, at 1275. 
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2. The Move to Notice Pleading 
By the 1930s, it was clear that code pleading was causing many of the 
same problems that led to the demise of common law pleading.38 The 
1938 revision to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted a notice 
pleading system to try to cure these pleading problems.39 Judge Charles 
E. Clark, the principal drafter of the new federal rules, suggested that the 
solution to the problems of common law pleading and code pleading was 
to “expect less” from pleadings.40 Not surprisingly, the new federal rules 
that Judge Clark helped to draft “massively deemphasize[d] the role of 
pleadings.”41 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require that a complaint 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim.”42 This was not meant 
to be a demanding standard. Dioguardi v. Durning,43 a familiar example 
from many first-year Civil Procedure courses, illustrates just how 
permissive notice pleading could be. The Dioguardi plaintiff submitted a 
home-drafted complaint, in broken English, that made only vague 
factual assertions without any real legal presentation.44 Judge Clark, 
writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, indicated that these new 
rules did not require that a plaintiff state enough facts to “constitute a 
cause of action.”45 Clark then held, “[w]e think that, however 
inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims.”46 
Seventy years later, Dioguardi resonates as an example of just how 
liberal pleading standards were meant to be under notice pleading. 
Dioguardi is a well-known notice pleading case because of its unique 
facts, but Conley v. Gibson47 provides a more accurate depiction of pre-
Twiqbal pleading.48 Conley was a class action suit brought by African 
American members of a railway organization against that organization, a 
38. See id. at 1276. 
39. Id. at 1277. 
40. See Clark, supra note 26, at 542. 
41. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990 (2003). 
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
43. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). 
44. Id. at 774–75. 
45. Id. at 775. 
46. Id. 
47. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
48. See Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 
HOW. L.J. 73, 73 (2008) (“For fifty years, Conley v. Gibson stood as the landmark decision on 
pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . , establishing that a complaint is sufficient 
to initiate a lawsuit if it gives fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
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local union, and a number of officers within both.49 The named-
plaintiff’s complaint was brief and conclusory.50 However, the Court 
upheld the validity of that filing, stating that, “the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon 
which he bases his claim.”51 Instead, pleadings need only “give the 
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests” in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.52 At the time Conley was decided, the Court felt it was enough 
to have liberal discovery and other pretrial tools to help litigants flesh 
out their claims.53 Under a notice pleading standard, the general rule was 
that a 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted if it was clear from the 
face of the complaint that the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts in 
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”54 That attitude 
toward pleading would survive for nearly fifty years. 
3. Plausibility Analysis: The Twiqbal Movement 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was the first Supreme Court decision 
to signal the end of the notice pleading era.55 In Twombly, the plaintiffs 
filed a class action antitrust suit against major telecommunications 
providers, alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade.56 The complaint 
alleged both parallel conduct and an actual agreement to restrain trade.57 
In spite of these allegations, the Court dismissed this complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6).58 In explaining its decision, the Court first retired the “no 
set of facts” language from Conley.59 Instead, the Court required 
complaints to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”60 The complaint in Twombly failed to meet that 
49. Id. at 42. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 47. 
52. See id. 
53. Id. at 47–48. 
54. Id. at 45–46. 
55. Because Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is still alive and well, federal courts 
are still governed under a “notice pleading” regime. The purpose of this Comment is not to argue 
that our current form of pleading is no longer “notice pleading” as Rule 8 defines it. Instead, I 
equate “notice pleading” with pre-Twiqbal pleading and “plausibility pleading” with post-Twiqbal 
pleading solely for the purpose of clearly marking the change brought about by these two decisions. 
56. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007). 
57. Id. at 550–51. 
58. Id. at 570. 
59. See id. at 561–63. 
60. Id. at 570. 
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standard.61 According to the Court, the allegations in the complaint may 
have made the conspiracy claim “conceivable,” but it was not 
“plausible.”62 As such, the case was dismissed, and plausibility analysis 
was born. 
After Twombly, the only remaining question was whether this new 
plausibility standard would be reserved specifically for antitrust actions. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal quickly dispelled any notion that the Court intended to 
impose such a limit.63 The Iqbal plaintiff was arrested and taken into 
federal custody in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.64 The 
plaintiff filed his complaint against various high-level government 
officials, arguing that he was deprived of various constitutional 
protections while in federal custody.65 The issue that eventually reached 
the Supreme Court was similar to the question addressed in Twombly: 
“Did respondent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual 
matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that petitioners deprived him 
of his clearly established constitutional rights[?]”66 
Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiff had not pled enough facts 
to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.67 In doing so, the Court stated 
that the plausibility rule announced in Twombly would apply to all civil 
actions.68 Iqbal echoed Twombly by noting that a plausible complaint 
requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”69 
Determining the difference between “conceivable” and “plausible” 
pleadings is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”70 In Iqbal, the Court 
determined that the plaintiff’s complaint “has not ‘nudged [his] claims’ 
of invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.’”71 As such, his complaint was dismissed.72 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 




68. Id. at 684. 
69. Id. at 678. 
70. Id. at 679. 
71. Id. at 680 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
72. See id. at 687. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, with instructions for that 
court to determine whether to remand the case back to the District Court so that the plaintiff could 
amend. Id. The Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 574 F.3d 820, 
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B. Attempts at Abrogation 
Scholars and legislators alike have harshly criticized the plausibility 
analysis championed by Twombly and Iqbal. For example, one scholar 
has deemed this new standard unconstitutional,73 while others have 
criticized the standard as bad policy.74 This criticism has led to repeated 
attempts to abrogate this ruling in Congress.75 To date, however, none of 
these attempts have yielded any change in Twombly and Iqbal’s effect. 
It also appears as though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will not 
be amended to override this new plausibility standard. At the time of this 
writing, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure has issued its proposed amendments for the 2016 Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.76 Although, at the time of this writing, those 
amendments are currently still in a public comment stage, no 
amendments to Rule 8 or Rule 12 have been proposed.77 
In short, for the time being, it appears as though plausibility pleading 
is here to stay. As such, litigants and courts will have to accept this new 
pleading standard. 
C. Plausibility Pleading: What Does It Mean for Litigants? 
Legal theorists have not yet come to an agreement on the effect that 
plausibility pleading has had on federal court litigation in terms of 
increased dismissals and added difficulty in accessing discovery.78 This 
822 (2d Cir. 2009). The case ultimately settled out of court. See Chad Howell, Note, Qualified 
Discovery: How Ashcroft v. Iqbal Endangers Discovery When Civil Rights Plaintiffs File Suit 
Against Government Officials, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 310 (2011). 
73. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal 
and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 38 (2010). 
74. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 5, at 34.  
75. See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2010); Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009); Notice Pleading Restoration 
Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). Extensive analysis of the congressional debates over 
these bills is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a concise summary of these bills, consider 
Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and 
Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 425–27 (2010). Alternatively, for a primary source on the 
congressional debate over this issue, see generally Open Access to Courts Act of 2009: Hearing on 
H.R. 4115 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. (2009).  
76. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, 
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 309–18 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf. 
77. Id. 
78. For examples of some studies on this subject, see supra note 19. 
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is not surprising; any statistical study aiming to quantify the effects of a 
decision like Iqbal is bound to face challenges.79 Plus, the decision is 
fairly recent. Generally speaking, however, the early evidence shows 
that more claims are being dismissed with leave to amend. This suggests 
that the amended complaint may be more important than ever before for 
litigants trying to gain access to the courts. 
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) conducted and issued one of the 
most prominent studies on the effects of Iqbal.80 Although the study 
found increases in the percentage of motions filed,81 and in the 
percentage of cases in which dismissal was granted in full or in part,82 
the FJC was quick to point out that these results were not statistically 
significant—suggesting that perhaps Twiqbal has not had the effect that 
legal scholars expected after all.83 This conclusion, however, has been 
widely criticized and countered in the literature.84 
It seems that Iqbal has had little effect on the likelihood that a motion 
to dismiss will be granted without leave to amend.85 But the same cannot 
be said for dismissals granted with leave to amend. The FJC study found 
that, from 2005–2006, the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted 
with leave to amend was around twenty-one percent; post-Iqbal, from 
2009–2010, that rate rose to thirty-five percent.86 Similar increases were 
seen across other studies.87 Though this statistical evidence is far from 
concrete, the takeaway from this data is that—in the year after Iqbal—
more claims were being dismissed, but most judges preferred to give 
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. 
Ultimately, Twiqbal’s effects are not yet clear from a statistical 
standpoint. However, determining Twiqbal’s exact impact is not crucial 
79. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 22–23 (noting that study was not able to account for 
certain types of cases or certain changes in pleading practice); Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths 
About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1366 n.140 (2010) (arguing that measuring 
the effect of Twiqbal cannot account for the cases that are not filed because of plausibility 
pleading); Hoffman, supra note 19, at 32–33 (pointing out that studies could not detect the number 
of “meritorious claim[s]” that were dismissed due to Twiqbal’s heightened standard). 
80. See generally CECIL ET AL., supra note 19.  
81. Id. at 9 tbl.1. 
82. Id. at 14 tbl.4. 
83. Id. at 21. 
84. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 34 (arguing that there are “reasons to be concerned that the 
[FJC] study may be providing us an incomplete picture of actual Rule 12(b)(6) activity”); Moore, 
supra note 19, at 607 (arguing that the FJC study “minimizes Iqbal’s impact in a variety of ways”). 
85. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 tbl.4; Moore, supra note 19, at 613 tbl.1. 
86. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 tbl.4. 
87. See Moore, supra note 19, at 613 tbl.1. 
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for this Comment. Instead, the key takeaway from this early evidence is 
the added emphasis on dismissals with leave to amend. A follow-up to 
the FJC study noted that sixty-six percent of the study’s plaintiffs who 
had their claims dismissed with leave to amend actually amended.88 If a 
higher percentage of claims are being dismissed with leave to amend, 
and around two-thirds of these dismissals lead to amendments, then the 
amended complaint is perhaps more important for litigants than it ever 
has been before. In fact, the updated FJC study indicated that “the 
opportunity to present an amended complaint reduced the overall rate at 
which movants prevail [on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion].”89 As such, the way 
in which courts analyze amended complaints going forward could have a 
major effect on access to federal courts. 
II. AMENDED COMPLAINTS: A SECOND BITE AT THE 
PLEADING APPLE 
The rules governing amended complaints are relatively short and 
straightforward. Amended complaints are governed by Rule 15 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.90 Rule 15 allows for “liberal 
amendment in the interests of resolving cases on the merits.”91 
Specifically, Rule 15(a) dictates that a party may amend its pleadings 
twenty-one days after serving it,92 or “with the opposing party’s written 
consent or the court’s leave.”93 The court is encouraged to give leave 
freely when justice requires.94 
Historically, the rules on amended complaints changed along the 
same lines that pleading standards did. Under common law pleading, a 
litigant generally had very little freedom to amend.95 Any amendment 
that attempted to plead a new cause of action—or even to change just the 
form of the action—was not allowed.96 Code pleading expanded the 
permissible scope of pleading amendments.97 Most courts allowed some 
88. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH 
LEAVE TO AMEND REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS 3 n.7 (2011). 
89. Id. at 4. 
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
91. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.02 (3d ed. 1997). 
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A). 
93. Id. 15(a)(2). 
94. Id. 
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form of amendment,98 but some continued to deny amendments that 
attempted to change the cause of action.99 In the years preceding the new 
1930s federal rules, amendment in federal courts was governed by 28 
U.S.C. § 777.100 That statute essentially gave federal courts complete 
control over the amendment process, and allowed courts to exhibit much 
more flexibility than was previously allowed under common law and 
code pleading regimes.101 This historical development of the rules on 
amended complaints ultimately led to the creation of Rule 15—which 
now governs amended complaints in federal courts.102 
Generally, the goals of the original Rule 15 were similar to the intent 
driving the rule today. Rule 15 provides a litigant with the “maximum 
opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits.”103 The Rule was 
designed to reflect the fact that pleadings were not intended to carry the 
burden of fact revelation and issue formation under the new federal 
rules.104 Ultimately, in the eighty years since the adoption of the federal 
rules, the language of Rule 15 has mostly remained consistent—
regardless of the standard of pleading that was in place at the time. 
Litigants need amended pleadings in order to have every chance to 
have their claim resolved on the merits.105 Amendments give parties a 
chance to assert a matter that was unknown or perhaps overlooked at the 
time the original complaint was filed.106 Amendments are commonly 
used to cure a defective pleading,107 or to correct and bolster 
insufficiently stated claims.108 Also, a party may amend to add,109 
substitute,110 or drop111 parties in the litigation. 
98. Id.  
99. Id.  
100. 28 U.S.C. § 777 (1934) (“[A]ny court of the United States . . . may at any time permit either 
of the parties to amend any defect in the process or pleadings, upon such conditions as it shall, in its 
discretion and by its rules, prescribe.”); see also 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471. 
101. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471. 
102. Rule 15 was derived from a number of sources. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory 
committee’s note (1937). These sources include the Equity Rules of 1912, various state codes and 
practices, and even some English rules. Id. 
103. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471, at 587. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. See Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1985). 
107. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1474. 
108. Id. 
109. E.g., Wilger v. Dep’t of Pensions & Sec. for Ala., 593 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1979). 
110. E.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1976). 
111. E.g., Samaha v. Presbyterian Hosp., 757 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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Before Twiqbal, certain rules regarding the relationship between 
amended complaints and original complaints were uniform and fairly 
simple. Under pre-Twiqbal Rule 15(a), an amended pleading superseded 
an original for the remainder of the action—unless, of course, that 
amended pleading is later amended.112 This means that the original 
complaint is essentially a “dead letter”113 that performs no function in 
the case.114 Therefore, any subsequent motion must be directed at the 
amended pleading instead of the original.115 An amended pleading 
represented a second bite at the pleading apple. 
These rules have largely been the norm since the incipiency of the 
federal rules in the 1930s. However, it is not entirely clear what effect—
if any—the Court’s ruling in Twombly and Iqbal will have on these 
long-established rules. 
III. TWIQBAL AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT: CHANGES IN 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
At the time of this Comment’s publication, it has been almost five 
years since the Court handed down Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In those five years, 
courts, litigants, and scholars alike have focused their attention almost 
entirely on plausibility pleading and the motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6).116 The relationship between plausibility pleading and amended 
pleadings has received very little attention in the legal field to date. 
However, courts in the Ninth Circuit have begun changing the rules on 
amended complaints in light of Twiqbal’s new pleading standard. With 
that change in mind, the time has come to consider whether this kind of 
change is warranted. 
A. The Issue: Does Twiqbal Justify Amending the Rules on Amended 
Complaints? 
The standard precedent governing amended complaints was formed 
during the era in which notice pleading reigned supreme. As litigants’ 
reliance on Twiqbal and the plausibility standard develops, challenges to 
112. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1476. 
113. Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008). 
114. E.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). One exception to this rule is 
the date on which the original complaint was filed, which is important for determination of whether 
the complaint “relates back” under Rule 15(c). FED. R. CIV. P. 15(C). 
115. E.g., Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991). 
116. For a few examples of articles focusing on the validity of plausibility pleading, see sources 
supra note 5. 
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the traditional rules governing amendments are starting to arise.117 These 
challenges have even gained some precedential momentum in the Ninth 
Circuit.118 This evolution is particularly predictable given the increase in 
the number of complaints that are being dismissed with leave to 
amend.119 
If courts decide to align with the Ninth Circuit and rewrite the 
common law rules governing amended complaints, the effects will not 
go unnoticed. If an amended complaint no longer completely supersedes 
its predecessor, then courts may compare original and amended 
complaints for the purposes of plausibility analysis. In that world, 
amending to add parties, to pursue new causes of action, and to plead 
additional facts could be enough for a court to dismiss an amended 
complaint as implausible.120 
The Iqbal decision is notably silent on the effect amended complaints 
have in the world of plausibility analysis.121 This is not surprising. 
Although the complaint that the Court ultimately dismissed in Iqbal had 
been amended, it does not appear that the Court had any interest in 
examining—and potentially rewriting—the rules on amended 
complaints. The fact that the plaintiff had filed an amended complaint 
was never mentioned by the Iqbal Court.122 Therefore, district courts and 
courts of appeals are largely working with a clean slate when it comes to 
the relationship between Twiqbal and amended complaints. 
With Twombly—and, even more so, Iqbal—the Court threw open the 
door to pleading reform. Therefore, if there was ever a time to change 
the way that amended complaints interact with their predecessors, now 
would be the time for courts to do so. 
B. Amended Complaints in the Ninth Circuit: The Comparison and 
Non-Comparison Approaches 
Challenges to the long-held presumptions surrounding Rule 15 and 
amended complaints have already begun to gain a foothold in the Ninth 
Circuit.123 In the past few years, a number of district courts have 
117. It appears as though the Ninth Circuit has already begun to take on challenges of this nature. 
See infra Part III.B. 
118. See infra Part III.B. 
119. See supra Part 0. 
120. For examples of the effects that this might have, see infra Part 0. 
121. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
122. Id. 
123. See Kennedy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 11–0675 MMC, 2011 WL 3359785, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011); Fasugbe v. Willms, No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, 
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compared allegations in an amended complaint to those filed in an 
original complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.124 For simplicity, I 
will refer to this approach as the “comparison approach.” This 
comparison approach has begun to develop in the Ninth Circuit,125 and 
the defense bar is slowly taking note.126 Still, not all courts in the Ninth 
Circuit are adopting the comparison approach; some have held steady 
and continue to apply the traditional doctrines.127 The approach taken by 
these courts will be referred to as the “non-comparison approach” 
throughout the remainder of this Comment. 
1. “Comparison Approach” Decisions 
Comparison approach courts have altered the traditional rules on 
amended complaints by comparing amended complaints to their 
predecessors on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Three district court 
decisions from the Ninth Circuit exemplify the comparison approach: 
Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-POSCO Industries,128 Cole v. 
Sunnyvale,129 and Fasugbe v. Willms.130 
Stanislaus was the first published district court case to adopt the 
comparison approach. In that case, a California tomato canner sued 
various manufacturers of tin-mill products, alleging various antitrust 
violations.131 One of the plaintiff’s major claims was that the defendants 
had entered into an agreement to restrain trade by allocating the tin mill 
at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011); Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 
1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Cole v. Sunnyvale, No. C-08-05017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). 
124. See infra Part 0. 
125. See infra Part 0. 
126. A number of defendant briefs in the Ninth Circuit have begun to argue that courts may 
compare amended complaints to original complaints as a part of the plausibility analysis. See, e.g., 
Defendant General Mills Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 
Complaint at 17, Lam v. General Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-CV-
5056-SC) (“The ‘context-specific’ inquiry required by Iqbal includes a comparison of facts alleged 
in prior complaints to those in the operative complaint.”); Defendant BNSF Railway Co.’s Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 20, Oxbow Carbon & Minerals v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:11-cv-01049 (PLF)) (arguing that the court 
should take account of the “blatant inconsistencies” between the first and second amended 
complaints to evaluate the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claims). 
127. See infra Part 0. 
128. 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
129. No. C-08-0517 RMW, 2010 WL 532428 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). 
130. No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011). 
131. Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. 
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products market.132 The plaintiff alleged that his agreement had caused 
significant negative effects in this market.133 In the plaintiff’s first 
amended complaint (FAC), the plaintiff pleaded that this agreement 
began in 1986.134 However, that claim was barred due to the statute of 
limitations.135 As such, plaintiff amended his pleading, and in the second 
amended complaint (SAC) the alleged date of the agreement was 
2006.136 Ultimately, the court considered these factual allegations 
insufficient in light of Twombly because they were not sufficient enough 
to make the plaintiff’s case plausible.137 Therefore, under Twombly, that 
claim was dismissed.138 
This holding, itself, is not significant or startling. But the fact that the 
court took note of the inconsistencies between the FAC and SAC is. The 
court recognized that “there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to prevent a party from filing successive pleadings that make 
inconsistent or even contradictory allegations.”139 However, the court 
also stated that “[t]he Court does not ignore the prior allegations in 
determining the plausibility of the current pleadings.”140 Ultimately, the 
district court decided that the plaintiff was free to plead this case as he 
wished, but the inconsistencies between the FAC and the SAC meant 
that the plaintiff needed to plead additional facts to make his allegations 
plausible.141 
A district court in the Northern District of California reached a similar 
result in Cole v. Sunnyvale.142 In that case, the plaintiff brought a civil 
rights claim against the City of Sunnyvale and members of the 
Sunnyvale police department for actions that arose out of a warrantless 
search of the plaintiff’s home.143 A number of the plaintiff’s claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were dismissed in the district court’s order.144 
Again, the court relied on previous pleadings in order to reach this 
132. Id. at 1063. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1075. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1076. 
138. Id. at 1081. 
139. Id. at 1076 (citing PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
140. Id. at 1075 (citation omitted). 
141. Id. at 1076. 
142. No. C-08-05017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). 
143. Id. at *1. 
144. Id. at *7. 
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conclusion.145 The court explicitly stated that it may “consider the prior 
allegations [from earlier complaints] as part of its ‘context-specific’ 
inquiry based on its judicial experience and common sense to assess 
whether the Third Amended Complaint plausibly suggests an entitlement 
to relief, as required under Iqbal.”146 The court then proceeded to 
consider portions of a letter that was attached as an exhibit to the 
original complaint, but had been detached from later amendments to the 
complaint.147 Ultimately, the court concluded that “[i]n consideration of 
the facts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, the facts alleged in 
prior iterations of the pleading, and [other case-specific facts],” the 
plaintiff had not pled enough to plausibly state a claim for relief.148 As 
such, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed.149 
Finally, in Fasugbe v. Willms, the plaintiffs brought suit in the Eastern 
District of California based on state law against a seller of online auction 
currency and its affiliates.150 The claims alleged revolved around 
violations of certain California consumer protection laws.151 In the 
original complaint, the plaintiffs attached a screenshot of the website in 
question that contained a section for payment submission; in the 
amended complaint, a nearly identical screenshot was attached, but the 
section for payment submission was slightly different in this version.152 
The court cited both Cole and Stanislaus in determining that it may 
consider the plausibility of the amended complaint in light of the 
allegations in the original complaint.153 Ultimately, the court compared 
the two pleadings and determined that the inconsistencies essentially 
condemned the plaintiff’s claims.154 
2. The Non-Comparison Approach 
The comparison approach appears to be gaining some strength within 
the Ninth Circuit, but there are still Ninth Circuit courts applying the 
non-comparison approach. These courts adhere to the traditional 
145. Id. at *3–4. 
146. Id. at *4. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
149. Id. 
150. No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at *5. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at *6. 
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amended-complaint doctrines. First, at the appellate level, PAE 
Government Services, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc.155—a 2007 decision that 
predates Iqbal—serves as a strong example of the traditional approach 
that the Ninth Circuit typically applies to amended complaints. Valadez-
Lopez v. Chertoff156—a post-Iqbal decision—suggests that this 
traditional doctrine might still be alive and well in the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit. Certain district courts have also adhered to this 
traditional rule. Lam v. General Mills, Inc.157 and State National 
Insurance Co. v. Khatri158 exemplify this approach at the district court 
level. 
The PAE Government Servces, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc. decision is a fairly 
typical example of the pre-Twiqbal approach to amended complaints. In 
that case, plaintiff PAE alleged that it had entered into a “Teaming 
Agreement” contract with defendant MPRI to share work on a 
government project.159 When MPRI won the bid for this project, PAE 
alleged that MPRI failed to enter into a subcontract with PAE, which 
was a breach of the “Teaming Agreement.”160 The district court, 
however, determined that this “Teaming Agreement” was governed by 
Virginia law, and Virginia does not permit enforcement of this kind of 
contract.161 As such, the original complaint was dismissed.162 
After dismissal, PAE amended its complaint to allege a second 
agreement that had taken place after MPRI won the government 
contract.163 This allegation was supported with some generalized factual 
assertions.164 The issue, however, was that this amended claim was 
contradictory to PAE’s original claim that MPRI’s wrongful conduct 
was its failure to enter into a second agreement with PAE in the first 
place.165 In fact, the district court struck these amended pleadings for 
that very reason.166 
155. 514 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2007). 
156. 656 F.3d. 851 (9th Cir. 2011). 
157. 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
158. No. C 13–00433 LB, 2013 WL 5183193 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013). 
159. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 857.  
160. Id.  
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 857–58. 
164. Id. at 858. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (“The district court found PAE’s new allegations of a second agreement with MPRI to be 
‘sham pleadings that contradict allegations made in the original Complaint.’”).  
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The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision.167 The court stated that the 
Rules of Civil Procedure govern a court’s ability to strike pleadings, and 
“there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent a 
party from filing successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even 
contradictory allegations.”168 Therefore, the fact that a litigant chose to 
make inconsistent pleadings does not give a district court “free-standing 
authority to strike pleadings.”169 In sum, the court held that “Rule 12 
provides no authority to dismiss ‘sham’ pleadings,” so the district court 
was wrong to compare the amended complaint to the original.170 
The rationale underlying holdings like the one articulated in MPRI 
lies in the traditional interpretations of Rule 15. As noted above, the 
traditional rule is that an amended complaint completely supersedes its 
predecessor.171 However, the Ninth Circuit issued this decision before 
Iqbal made it clear that plausibility pleading applies to all cases in 
federal courts. In other words, although MPRI articulated a well-
supported rule regarding amended complaints, that rule developed 
during the notice pleading era. As such, it is not clear what effect—if 
any—the Twiqbal plausibility movement could have on this decision. 
However, a post-Iqbal Ninth Circuit decision, Valadez-Lopez v. 
Chertoff, tangentially affirmed that MPRI’s interpretation of Rule 15 is 
still alive and well within the Ninth Circuit.172 In this case, Valadez-
Lopez brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the 
government in an amended complaint.173 The government cited Rule 
15(c) and argued that this FTCA claim was inappropriate because 
Valadez-Lopez’s amended complaint “relates back” to the date of the 
original pleading, and Valadez-Lopez had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies at the time the original pleading was filed.174 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument for two reasons. First, the 
court said that Rule 15(c) was not applicable in this case because that 
Rule was reserved for statute of limitations issues. Second, the court 
stated that “it is well-established that an ‘amended complaint supersedes 
167. Id. at 860. 
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 859.  
170. Id. at 860. The court also stated that this type of situation—where amended pleadings may 
suggest bad faith—is best dealt with under Rule 11. Id. That alternative solution will be discussed 
infra Part 0. 
171. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
172. 656 F.3d. 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011).  
173. Id. at 854. 
174. Id. at 857. 
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the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”175 This 
latter statement was dicta, but it still suggests that the Ninth Circuit may 
be working under the traditional amended complaint rules articulated in 
MPRI.176 
District courts also follow this non-comparison approach. Lam v. 
General Mills, Inc. serves as an example. In Lam, the plaintiff brought a 
consumer class action suit against General Mills on the grounds that 
General Mills had misled consumers about the nutritional qualities of 
some popular fruit snacks.177 Due to allegations of inconsistencies 
between the First Amended Complaint and the original complaint, both 
parties briefed the comparison and non-comparison approaches.178 In 
response, the Lam court began its analysis by largely ignoring these 
arguments and simply stating, “on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 
Court takes all well-pleaded facts in Lam’s First Amended 
Complaint . . . the operative pleading, as true.”179 There was never any 
discussion about potentially comparing the amended complaint to its 
predecessor; in fact, the original complaint was never mentioned in the 
opinion.180 Instead, the Lam court simply applied the plausibility 
analysis to the facts alleged within the First Amended Complaint, 
despite the fact that the defense advocated for the comparison approach 
during briefing.181 
The district court in State National Insurance Co. v. Khatri directly 
rejected the comparison approach.182 The Khatri litigation hinged on an 
insurance company’s reimbursement claims against a former insurance 
175. Id. (quoting Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Loux v. 
Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967))). See also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th 
Cir. 2012). In Lacey the Ninth Circuit etched out an exception to this traditional rule that an 
amended complaint completely took its predecessor off the table for purposes of appeal. Id. The 
court indicated that a plaintiff may appeal dismissal of claims that were included in an original 
complaint but dropped in the amended complaint due to the trial court’s instructions. Id. As the 
court pointed out, this holding does not undermine the traditional rule that an amended complaint 
supersedes the original. Id.  
176. One could argue that this precedent suggests that the comparison approach movement is just 
acting on “bad law.” I explore that argument in more detail below. See infra Part 0.  
177. Lam v. General Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
178. See Defendant General Mills Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 126, at 17; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant General 
Mills Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, at 13 n.7, Lam v. General 
Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal 2012) (No. 11-CV-5056-SC). 
179. Lam, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1099–1100 (emphasis added). 
180. See generally Lam, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1097. 
181. Id. at 1101. 
182. No. C 13–00433 LB, 2013 WL 5183193 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013). 
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policy holder.183 There were two complaints filed in this litigation. In the 
original complaint, State National alleged that it had been involved in 
two separate settlement hearings on the defendant’s behalf, and the final 
settlement offer reached was $137,500.184 In the amended complaint, 
however, State National claimed that there had only been one settlement 
hearing, and the final settlement offer was $125,000.185 The court 
recognized that “State National’s story appears to have changed from its 
Original Complaint to its First Amended Complaint.”186 Despite this 
change, the district court declined to compare these two complaints as a 
part of the plausibility analysis.187 Instead, the court cited MPRI and 
reiterated the rule that plaintiffs may make inconsistent or contradictory 
pleadings because “at the outset of a case, a plaintiff may not have all of 
the facts completely nailed down.”188 The court recognized that 
decisions like Cole and Fasugbe were on the books, but ultimately 
determined that the MPRI holding was more persuasive.189 
C. Confusion Going Forward: Which Approach Has the Better 
Argument? 
The cases outlined in the previous section show that this issue is 
hardly a model of clarity in the Ninth Circuit. Courts have recognized 
the existence of the comparison approach and litigants are trying to take 
advantage of this emerging doctrine. At the same time, there appears to 
be support for the non-comparison approach in the Ninth Circuit. 
Although this issue is still just in its incipiency, it is important to quash 
this confusion before this divide has time to grow and potentially reach 
other circuits. As such, in order to avoid inequitable administration of 
the law, the Ninth Circuit needs to resolve this confusion before it 
spreads. 
183. Id. at *3. 
184. Id. at *6. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at *7. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at *6–7. 
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD DECLINE TO CHANGE THE 
WAY THAT COURTS VIEW AMENDED COMPLAINTS AND 
REAFFIRM THE NON-COMPARISON APPROACH 
The non-comparison approach is preferable to the comparison 
approach. Courts grant leave to amend complaints in order to give 
litigants a second bite at the pleading apple. If courts regularly begin 
comparing amended complaints to original complaints as a part of this 
new plausibility analysis, the usefulness of amended complaints may 
diminish. The new Twiqbal standard is tough enough on plaintiffs; 
courts do not need to further heighten this standard to ensure fairness 
among litigants. Instead, litigants need to have the opportunity to amend 
freely because the litigation process is complex and ever-changing. Plus, 
there are already tools in place to deal with unfairly inconsistent 
pleadings. As such, this Comment argues that the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit should reiterate the original rule that an amended 
complaint completely takes an original complaint off the table for the 
purposes of the plausibility analysis. 
The practice of comparing amended complaints to their predecessors 
appears to still be in its infancy. But this issue is quickly becoming ripe 
for a Ninth Circuit appellate decision because the district courts cannot 
agree on how amended complaints should be treated in a post-Twiqbal 
world. The decisions referenced above demonstrate that a number of 
district courts believe that comparing amended complaints to their 
predecessors is a part of the plausibility analysis.190 However, other 
recent decisions came out differently.191 A Ninth Circuit decision 
resolving this split could have lasting effects on the way litigants plead 
cases. 
This Comment argues that, on balance, the non-comparison approach 
has the better side of the argument. The comparison approach could 
potentially force litigants to come to court with a well-pled case, which 
would have efficiency benefits for courts and litigants. But the potential 
for efficiency is not enough to outweigh two significant problems with 
the comparison approach. First, the comparison approach’s methodology 
is problematic simply from a stare decisis point of view. Based on 
precedent alone, the court could strike down the comparison approach. 
Second, the comparison approach is not justifiable from a policy 
standpoint because it adds very little value to our current pleading 
190. See supra Part 0.  
191. See supra Part 0.  
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system. Adopting the comparison approach to stop “fishing” expeditions 
is unnecessary. Courts have other tools at their disposal to deal with 
poorly-pled cases. If a party’s pleadings are egregiously inconsistent, for 
example, courts are free to deal with this “sham” pleading through 
alternative methods—including Rule 11. Ultimately, the reality of the 
litigation process is that each case is complex and constantly changing. 
Litigants need to have the opportunity to amend freely in order to 
successfully navigate that process. 
For these reasons, this Comment argues that—when the opportunity 
arises192—the Ninth Circuit should decline to adopt these new rules and 
instead re-assert the traditional rules surrounding amended complaints. 
A. The Comparison Approach Decisions Are Based on Weak 
Precedential Foundations 
Twiqbal may be silent on the issue of comparing amended complaints 
to original complaints, but the Ninth Circuit has not been. Comparing 
amended complaints to original complaints as a part of the plausibility 
analysis casts aside a wide body of jurisprudence on the purpose of 
amended complaints.193 This suggests that the comparison approach 
decisions referenced above are—for lack of a better term—“bad law.” 
This is one of the most compelling reasons why the Ninth Circuit needs 
to clear up the uncertainty in this area. 
1. Twiqbal Is Silent on the Comparison Approach 
Supporters of the comparison approach would likely argue that this 
approach is consistent with Twiqbal. The obvious intent behind both 
Twombly and Iqbal was to raise the pleading bar and force litigants to 
come to the table with a strong factual foundation for their cases.194 
Viewed in that light, the comparison approach appears to align with 
Twiqbal. Refusing to give litigants a blank slate upon which they may 
re-plead their case would levy additional pressure on plaintiffs to get 
facts right the first time. From an efficiency standpoint, perhaps that is a 
192. At the time of this writing, there is no litigation pending that presents this issue. Due to the 
fact that this doctrine is still in its infancy, it is difficult to predict when the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit might get a case that does present this issue.  
193. See infra Part 0. 
194. See Miller, supra note 5, at 19 (“By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and Iqbal, 
have transformed the function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by imposing a more 
demanding standard that requires a greater factual foundation than previously was required or 
originally intended.”). 
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desirable result that aligns well with this new standard of plausibility 
analysis. 
Before jumping to this conclusion, however, it is important to take a 
look at the text of Twiqbal. True, Twiqbal was concerned with 
efficiency, which is one of the main benefits of the comparison 
approach. But is that similar interest enough to argue that Twiqbal 
justifies changing the rules on amended complaints? Ultimately, the 
answer to that question, based on the text of the Twiqbal opinions alone, 
is not clear. 
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal give any clear guidance on the validity of 
the comparison approach’s rationale. Twombly never really comes close 
to reaching the issue of comparing amended complaints to originals. The 
court simply held that, in the antitrust context, “a plaintiff’s obligation to 
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do.”195 For claims under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, that simply required pleading “enough factual matter” to 
suggest an agreement was made.196 Amended complaints were never at 
issue. 
Iqbal is equally unclear. Iqbal resolved the issue about the reach of 
Twombly and plausibility pleading,197 but the relationship between 
original complaints and amended complaints was also not before the 
Court in that case. The closest the Iqbal decision comes to endorsing the 
comparison approach comes in its ambiguous statement that plausibility 
pleading requires a “context-specific” inquiry.198 But the opinion does 
not dictate what this “context-specific” inquiry includes. 
Comparison approach supporters could argue that Iqbal’s “context-
specific” inquiry allows a court to compare amended complaints to their 
predecessors.199 One immediate problem with this conclusion is its 
195. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 
196. Id. at 556. 
197. See Steinman, supra note 21, at 1296 (“Concerns about Twombly have been exacerbated by 
Iqbal, which eliminated any hope that Twombly might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust 
cases.”). 
198. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
199. In fact, the Cole v. Sunnyvale court reached this conclusion. Cole v. Sunnyvale, No. C-08-
05017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). The district court concluded that it 
“may . . . consider the prior allegations [from an earlier complaint] as part of its ‘context-specific’ 
inquiry based on its judicial experience and common sense to assess whether the Third Amended 
Complaint plausibly suggests an entitlement to relief, as required under Iqbal.” Id. Iqbal was the 
court’s only authority for this proposition; no Ninth Circuit case was cited to bolster this point. Id. 
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characterization of Iqbal. Iqbal memorialized the Twombly plausibility 
pleading standard in a broader context.200 The Court reiterated that a 
judge must determine whether the complaint has actually “shown”—as 
opposed to merely “alleged”—that the pleader is entitled to relief.201 
Nothing in Iqbal proposed to alter the way that courts consider amended 
pleadings. The decision certainly changed the standard under which 
pleadings would be scrutinized in federal courts. However, the Court did 
not directly amend any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Judicial 
experience and common sense” must factor into the post-Iqbal 
analysis.202 But altering the traditional interpretations of Rule 15 and 
amended complaints in the name of “judicial experience and common 
sense” seems like an overreach. 
Ultimately, Twiqbal is not clear on this issue. Twombly and Iqbal 
neither support nor reject the comparison approach. As such, it remains 
up to the lower courts to develop their own precedent on this issue. 
2. Ninth Circuit Precedent Is Inapposite to the Comparison Approach 
Both the MPRI and Valadez-Lopez decisions strongly support the 
traditional rules regarding amended complaints. The Valadez-Lopez 
court restated MPRI’s rule that amended complaints supersede original 
filings.203 When amended complaints supersede original filings, the 
original complaint becomes a dead letter that no longer performs any 
function in the case.204 If the original complaint no longer performs any 
function in the case, then courts would presumably be unable to compare 
amended complaints to original complaints.205 As such, this language 
from the Valadez-Lopez decision arguably precludes the comparison 
approach—simply as a matter of stare decisis.206 
200. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 
‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
201. Id. at 679. 
202. See id. 
203.  See generally Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d. 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “it 
is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated 
thereafter as non-existent” (internal quotations omitted)).  
204. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.  
205. Lam v. General Mills, Inc. and State National Insurance Co. v. Khatri serve as good 
examples of cases that applied this particular logic. See supra notes 177–189 and accompanying 
text. 
206. The doctrine of stare decisis “compels lower courts to follow the decisions of higher courts 
on questions of law.” 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 91, § 134.01[1]. Valadez-Lopez was handed 
down by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See generally Valadez-Lopez, 656 F.3d. at 851. 
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The problem with this argument is that its validity hangs on what is 
most likely an overstatement of the actual precedential value of Valadez-
Lopez. The motion in that case was not a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.207 This means that Iqbal and the plausibility 
pleading standard were not implicated. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s 
affirmation of MPRI’s rule that amended complaints supersede their 
predecessors was dicta. The court decided Valadez-Lopez on an 
attempted misuse of the relation back guidelines in Rule 15(c).208 That is 
not the same issue that has fueled the debate between the comparison 
and non-comparison approach. 
In sum, the Valadez-Lopez decision—combined with the MPRI rule—
casts doubt on the validity of the comparison approach decisions 
referenced above. The Ninth Circuit could justify resolving this issue 
without even looking at the comparison approach decisions. But, MPRI 
was decided pre-Iqbal, and the Valadez-Lopez decision does not 
conclusively resolve this issue. As such, a more in-depth analysis of the 
actual comparison approach decisions is warranted. 
3. Comparison Approach Decisions that Emerge Post-Iqbal Are 
Based on Inadequate Precedent 
Ninth Circuit precedent may not categorically resolve this debate, but 
the precedent that the comparison approach decisions use to justify their 
approach seems unpersuasive. Stanislaus exemplifies these weaknesses. 
That court attempted to pay homage to the traditional rules surrounding 
amended pleadings.209 But the resulting opinion did not cite and use 
those rules correctly. In Stanislaus, the court cited Ellingson v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc.210 in support of the proposition that “[t]he 
Court does not ignore the prior allegations in determining the plausibility 
of the current pleadings.”211 The Ellingson court did state that courts 
may consider certain judicially-noticeable facts, court records, and 
affidavits in a motion to strike the pleadings as “sham” under Rule 11.212 
If the Valadez-Lopez court’s restatement of the MPRI rule is considered a part of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision on a question of law, then lower courts in the Ninth Circuit—including the comparison 
approach courts—would be required to follow this rule.   
207. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
208. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
209. Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 
2011) (distinguishing PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
210. 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981). 
211. Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
212. Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1329–30. 
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But this holding does not support the comparison approach in the way 
that the Stanislaus court suggested it does.213 
The main problem with citing Ellingson is that MPRI, not Ellingson, 
should have controlled in Stanlislaus. Ellingson was a 1981 Ninth 
Circuit decision that conflicts with the much more recent 2007 Ninth 
Circuit decision in MPRI.214 MPRI specifically held that courts were not 
permitted to compare amended complaints to original complaints on a 
motion to strike pleadings.215 That was essentially the issue in 
Stanislaus, and the court should have taken note of this similarity and 
followed MPRI’s ruling.216 In contrast, the Ellingson court approved of 
the use of certain “judicially noticeable” documents like affidavits and 
prior court documents.217 There is a significant difference between 
judicially noticeable facts, which are governed by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201,218 and amended complaints, which are controlled by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.219 Furthermore, the Ellingson court 
affirmed dismissal under Rule 11, while the issue in Stanislaus was a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12.220 This distinction matters because the 
standard for dismissal under Rule 11 has important differences—in both 
form and purpose—from the standard under Rule 12.221 
After citing Ellingson in support of the notion that courts can compare 
pleadings as part of the plausibility analysis, the Stanislaus court 
attempted to address the MPRI decision.222 The court recognized that 
“that there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent 
a party from filing successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even 
contradictory allegations.”223 Despite noting this rule, the court 
proceeded to rely on the inconsistencies between the two pleadings as 
213. See Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (citing Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1329). 
214. See supra notes 167–170 and accompanying text for a discussion of MPRI’s holding. 
215. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 860. 
216. As noted above, there is potentially room to distinguish MPRI as a pre-Iqbal case; however, 
the Stanislaus court did not justify this comparison approach by citing to Iqbal. Instead, that court 
cited Ellingson—which was also a pre-Iqbal decision—as if it had been the rule all along. See 
Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1075–76. 
217. Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1329–30. 
218. See FED. R. EVID. 201. 
219. Generally, a court is permitted to take judicial notice of certain types of facts that are “not 
subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. This is a very different standard than the one articulated in Rule 
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
220. Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1330; Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. 
221. These differences will be explored below. See infra Part 0. 
222. See Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 
223. Id. (quoting PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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part of its rationale for finding against the plaintiff. Specifically, the 
court concluded that a plaintiff is free to amend a complaint with 
inconsistent allegations, but doing so will require “more factual support” 
in order to survive a motion to dismiss.224 
Viewed in this light, the Stanislaus court misinterpreted the traditional 
rules surrounding amended complaints. The whole purpose of allowing a 
plaintiff leave to amend is to give that plaintiff a meaningful opportunity 
to re-plead his or her case.225 To achieve this, amended complaints must 
take their predecessors off the table for the remainder of the litigation.226 
There is no support within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
notion that litigants who plead inconsistent or contradictory materials 
within an amended complaint have to meet a higher pleading 
standard.227 As discussed in more detail below, the litigation process is a 
fluid one—especially for plaintiffs trying to gather the right facts and 
plead the right claim.228 This often requires changing parties, altering 
causes of action, and tweaking factual allegations.229 So long as 
plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of Rule 15, they should not have 
to overcome a higher pleading bar simply because they were not able to 
get their complaint right the first time. Instead, plaintiffs who amend 
should be required to meet the same pleading standard as those who 
choose not to. 
Once Stanislaus had been decided, the comparison approach had 
created enough of a foothold to start to gain traction within the Ninth 
Circuit district courts. Fasugbe v. Willms illustrates this point. In that 
case, the district court cited Cole and Stanislaus in support of the 
conclusion that “the court may properly consider the plausibility of the 
[First Amended Complaint] in light of the prior allegations [in the 
original complaint].”230 Other litigants are also taking note. A number of 
defendants have begun to insert the boilerplate language in these 
224. Id. 
225. See supra notes 103–111 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
227. Although the MPRI court did not consider a higher pleading standard for inconsistent 
pleadings, the court did make a strong statement in favor of a litigant’s right to make inconsistent 
pleadings freely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“The short of it is that there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent 
a party from filing successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even contradictory allegations.”).  
228. See infra Part 0. 
229. See MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 858–59 (noting that litigants need the freedom to amend because 
litigation is such a fluid process). 
230. Fasugbe v. Willms, No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 
May 26, 2011). 
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decisions into their briefing on motions to dismiss.231 It appears that the 
comparison approach is taking hold of a number of Ninth Circuit district 
courts and the litigants who practice there, regardless of whether these 
foundational decisions are soundly supported or not. 
4. The District Courts Applying the Non-Comparison Approach Are 
More Persuasive 
In sum, the approach highlighted above by Khatri and Lam232 is based 
on stronger precedent than the one outlined in Stanislaus, Cole, 
Fasugbe, and other comparison approach decisions.233 I argue that the 
comparison approach is not in line with Twiqbal, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and traditional Ninth Circuit precedent. Widespread 
adoption of this approach would require revisions or additions to each of 
these doctrines. In contrast, the non-comparison approach seems to 
avoid many of these issues. On that reason alone, the Ninth Circuit 
should refuse to adopt the comparison approach. 
Even though the Ninth Circuit could resolve this split by simply 
reiterating that MPRI and the non-comparison approach still apply, this 
Comment looks deeper into this divide. The exact boundaries of Twiqbal 
remain in question,234 and both MPRI and Valadez-Lopez have 
weaknesses that could be exploited on appeal.235 If faced with the 
argument, the Ninth Circuit could hold that Twiqbal’s new plausibility 
analysis and the “context-specific” inquiry justifies ramping up the rules 
on amended complaints. In fact, the Cole court has already adopted this 
interpretation of Twiqbal.236 As noted above, the text of Twombly and 
Iqbal is not clear enough to determinatively call that interpretation 
inaccurate. In sum, even though existing precedent appears to fall in 
favor of the non-comparison approach, this Comment will also explore 
the policy justifications supporting both of these approaches. 
231. See, e.g., Defendant General Mills Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 126, at 17 (“The ‘context-specific’ inquiry required by 
Iqbal includes a comparison of facts alleged in prior complaints to those in the operative 
complaint.”); Defendant BNSF Railway Co.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint, supra note 126, at 20 (arguing that the court should take account of the “blatant 
inconsistencies” between the first and second amended complaints to evaluate the plausibility of the 
plaintiff’s claims). 
232. See supra notes 177–189 and accompanying text for the discussion of these cases. 
233. See supra Part III.B.1 for the discussion of the comparison approach decisions. 
234. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
235. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
236. See supra note 199. 
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B. The Policy Arguments Supporting the Comparison Approach Do 
Not Justify the Added Burden that Would Be Placed on Litigants If 
that Approach Were Adopted 
Although the Ninth Circuit could feasibly justify striking down the 
comparison approach based on precedent—or a lack thereof—alone, the 
court could also swing the other way based on the impact that Twiqbal 
has had on pleading standards. As such, the debate over these two 
approaches may boil down to a policy argument. 
The comparison approach is not supported by strong policy 
arguments. In theory,237 comparison approach supporters have one major 
argument in their corner: added efficiency. Requiring plaintiffs to plead 
consistently might help to weed out unmeritorious claims and quell 
“sham” litigation.238 Although these potential benefits appear compelling 
at first glance, they are not enough to outweigh the costs of adopting the 
comparison approach for two reasons. First, any added efficiency would 
be outweighed by the loss plaintiffs could suffer if the comparison 
approach took hold. Litigation is a fluid process, and Rule 15 is in place 
to allow plaintiffs to successfully navigate the complications that arise 
throughout that process.239 The comparison approach unfairly 
undermines that goal.240 Second, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
contemplate other methods of dealing with unfairly inconsistent 
pleadings.241 If a litigant is particularly disingenuous—to the point that it 
appears as though he or she may be involved in a “fishing” expedition—
then the opposing party can use Rule 11 sanctions to resolve that 
problem. The current pleading system does not need the comparison 
approach’s additional protection. 
With these two points in mind, the comparison approach is difficult to 
237. The policy arguments discussed in this section are theoretical constructs created for this 
Comment. As of this writing, this is the first piece of scholarship to assess the relationship between 
amended complaints and the Twiqbal plausibility standard. As such, I have tried to project logical 
policy arguments onto the comparison approach for purposes of assessing the validity of that 
approach. 
238. This seems to be the motivating factor behind some of the comparison approach decisions 
discussed above. See, e.g., Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 
1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (expressing concern about a twenty-year gap between the agreement 
alleged in the original complaint and the agreement alleged in the amended complaint); Fasugbe v. 
Willms, No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) 
(noting that plaintiff’s explanation of differences between screenshot attached in original complaint 
and screenshot attached in amended complaint “is not plausible”). 
239. See supra Part II. 
240. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
241. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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justify. As such, the Ninth Circuit should avoid creating more 
controversy for an already controversial pleading doctrine that is still in 
its infancy. Instead, the court of appeals should err on the side of caution 
and apply the more traditional non-comparison approach. 
1. The Added Efficiency that the Comparison Approach May Provide 
Is Outweighed by the Need to Give Litigants Pleading Flexibility 
The efficiency argument behind comparison approach decisions is not 
enough to justify the burden this approach potentially will place on 
litigants. Comparison approach supporters could argue that tying a 
plaintiff to an original complaint may help force plaintiffs to come to the 
table with a better pled case from the outset. Theoretically, this could 
help curb the type of discovery “fishing” expeditions that the Twiqbal 
Courts seemed so concerned with,242 while simultaneously saving time 
and resources  by weeding out unworthy claims earlier in the litigation 
process.243 Viewed in that light, the comparison approach seems fairly 
consistent with the guiding purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding.”244 
Yet any value added by the comparison approach comes at the cost of 
the amended complaint. This cost would be a significant one. As the 
MPRI court noted, the amendment process is quite valuable for litigants, 
given how uncertain the early stages of litigation can be: 
At the time a complaint is filed, the parties are often uncertain 
about the facts and the law; and yet, prompt filing is encouraged 
and often required by a statute of limitations, laches, the need to 
preserve evidence and other such concerns. . . . As the litigation 
progresses, and each party learns more about its case and that of 
its opponents, some allegations fall by the wayside as legally or 
factually unsupported. . . . Parties usually abandon claims 
242. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling 
the Twombly majority’s concerns about “fishing expedition[s]” unwarranted); Jonathan D. Frankel, 
Note, May We Plead the Court? Twombly, Iqbal, and the “New” Practice of Pleading, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1222 (2010) (identifying the policy concerns addressed in Twiqbal as 
“plaintiff fishing expeditions, costly discovery, and the slim hope of effective judicial supervision 
during discovery”). 
243. The Iqbal Court seemed concerned with unnecessary costs and wasted time—especially 
when lawsuits are filed against the government. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) 
(“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in 
terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed 
to the proper execution of the work of the Government.”).  
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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because, over the passage of time and through diligent work, 
they have learned more about the available evidence and viable 
legal theories, and wish to shape their allegations to conform to 
these newly discovered realities. We do not call this process 
sham pleading; we call it litigation.245 
Federal courts certainly have an interest in requiring litigants to 
initiate a lawsuit with a well thought out complaint, but plausibility 
pleading largely takes care of that concern. Any plaintiff who cannot 
plead sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible” will risk 12(b)(6) dismissal.246 But if a litigant 
can amend an original complaint in a way that independently satisfies 
the plausibility pleading standard, that litigant should survive a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. In order to meet that standard, however, federal courts 
need to allow plaintiffs to plead with flexibility. Rule 15 is designed to 
provide plaintiffs with that flexibility; the comparison approach unfairly 
undermines that goal. 
2. Concerns over Sham—Or Bad Faith—Pleading Are More 
Appropriately Addressed Under Rule 11 
The argument that the comparison approach would help weed out 
“sham” litigation is also not enough to justify changing the rules on 
amended complaints. Twiqbal makes the Rule 12 motion more important 
than ever before, which puts additional pressure on plaintiffs to survive 
this type of motion.247 Twiqbal aimed to force litigants to come to the 
table with enough factual assertions to form a well-pleaded complaint248 
in order to try to quell some of the costs of discovery.249 Proponents of 
the comparison approach might argue that this approach helps achieve 
these goals. Under the non-comparison approach, a plaintiff could 
repeatedly amend a complaint with entirely inconsistent facts until he or 
245. PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2007). 
246. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
247. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
248. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (requiring litigants file complaints with 
“well-pleaded factual allegations” that lead to a plausible claim for relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556 (noting that plaintiffs have to be able to plead “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence” of the claim asserted).  
249. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply 
with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and 
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the 
Government.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (noting that courts should not “forget that proceeding 
to . . . discovery can be expensive” when determining whether plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 8’s 
demands). 
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she pleads something that either satisfies a court or leads to dismissal 
without leave to amend. In contrast, if courts can compare an amended 
complaint to its predecessor, then litigants will want to make sure that 
the facts pled in each complaint are accurate and well thought out. This 
would theoretically discourage plaintiffs from “fishing” for the facts 
necessary to create a plausible complaint. 
Courts should not ignore “sham” pleadings; however, Rule 12 is not 
the proper Rule to deal with such pleadings. Instead, challenges to 
“sham” pleadings should be left to Rule 11. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11(b) states: 
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the 
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the 
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably 
based on belief or a lack of information.250 
Rule 11(c) gives the court authority to issue sanctions for violations of 
Rule 11(b), when appropriate.251 Rule 11 can handle the type of “sham” 
litigation that proponents of the comparison approach are concerned 
with.252 
The Ninth Circuit has indicated that courts should use Rule 11 when 
pleadings suggest dishonesty.253 In MPRI, for example, the court of 
appeals stated that its holding “does not mean, of course, that allegations 
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
251. Id. 11(c). 
252. See 5A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1334 (“The [1993] amended signature 
requirement [of Rule 11] mandates that signers weigh their behavior against their duties as 
professionals, particularly their duty to the judicial system, which includes a duty to refrain from 
wasting its resources on frivolous or otherwise improper litigation requests.”). 
253. PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2007); Ellingson v. 
Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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in a complaint can never be frivolous, or that a district court can never 
determine that a complaint or answer was filed in bad faith. But the 
mechanism for doing so is in Rule 11, which deals specifically with bad 
faith conduct.”254 Courts applying the non-comparison approach have 
picked up on this language and adopted it.255 
If courts start comparing and contrasting amended and original 
complaints at the 12(b)(6) stage due to concerns over “sham” litigation, 
then Rule 11 could be engulfed by Rule 12(b)(6). This would be 
problematic for a number of reasons. As a policy matter, accusations of 
dishonesty or bad faith should not be levied against parties lightly. Rule 
11 sets out very specific procedural safeguards for those accused of bad 
faith that are not contained in Rule 12.256 These safeguards protect the 
reputation of the accused, and ensure that courts have ample information 
in front of them to make a reasoned determination on bad faith. 
Another issue is that the scope of Rule 12 motions is too limited to 
determine whether bad faith is really in play. Rule 12(b)(6) is concerned 
with the legal sufficiency of a litigant’s complaint.257 Therefore, the 
issue before the court on a 12(b)(6) motion should be limited to the legal 
facts and conclusions contained in the complaint before it.258 The facts in 
a complaint—even if they are inconsistent with earlier complaints—are 
hardly enough to determine that a party acted in bad faith. To really 
make this determination, a court should have more information available 
to consider than is normally allowed on a 12(b)(6) motion. Furthermore, 
one of the touchstones of 12(b)(6) analysis is that the court must view all 
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.259 It seems hard to 
reconcile this rule with the notion that courts can compare and contrast 
pleadings to determine that a particular pleading is a “sham.” 
Ultimately, federal courts have a strong interest in deterring litigants 
from pleading “sham” complaints; however, Rule 11 is capable of 
deterring that kind of conduct. If a defendant has evidence to support an 
allegation of bad faith pleading, then a motion can be brought for 
sanctions under Rule 11. Allowing courts to compare complaints, infer a 
litigant’s intent, and label that conduct as “bad faith” or a “sham” at the 
12(b)(6) stage would not be appropriate. 
254. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 859. 
255. See, e.g., State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Khatri, No. C 13–00433 LB, 2013 WL 5183193, at *6 n.3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013). 
256. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
257. Id. 12(b). 
258. Id. 
259. See 5B WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1357. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is not clear when the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will 
have the opportunity to address the division between these two 
approaches. When that opportunity arises, however, the court should 
refuse to adopt the comparison approach, and restate the rule that 
amended complaints take their predecessors off the table. In the interim, 
courts in other circuits should also decline to adopt this emerging 
comparison approach to amended complaints. Plausibility pleading has 
the potential to become cumbersome enough on plaintiffs. There is no 
need to further this burden by taking away a plaintiff’s ability to freely 
amend. Instead, plaintiffs should be allowed to have the same second 
bite at the pleading apple that has been given to litigants in federal courts 
since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted in the 
1930s. 
 
 
